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This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to measure the impact of 
exemptions from school fees on the desegregation of formerly white and coloured 
schools in post-apartheid South Africa. Schools which were designated for whites 
under apartheid often charge high fees, equal to a substantial portion of average 
black and coloured households’ income. Consequently, policy makers have worried 
that fees act as a mechanism for de facto racial segregation in schools, and have 
created income-tested fee exemption policies to counteract this effect. However, I 
find no evidence that eligibility for a fee exemption increases the probability that a 
black student will attend a formerly coloured or white school, or that a coloured 
student will attend a formerly white school. I also find no statistically significant 
relationship between income and school choice for black students, and a small, 
significant relationship for coloured students. The results of this analysis show that 
income and fees, contrary to conventional wisdom, may not be key factors in the 
choice between racially defined school categories. This finding calls into question 
the relevance of the current fee exemption policy, and suggests that we need to 
develop a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of race and inequality in 






School choice has become a popular codeword for the marketization of public 
education. The concept has received political attention all over the world because 
the introduction of choice and competition into the education arena can be seen as a 
way to increase student achievement and school quality. School choice has also 
taken on racial implications in countries, such as South Africa and the United 
States, where both income inequality and academic achievement gaps tend to fall 
along racial lines. However, the actual impact of school choice on the opportunities 
and achievement of students of different races is difficult to predict, because little is 
understood about the drivers of educational choice or the relationship between race, 
choice, and achievement. The reality is that educational choices are hugely 
complex, and often constrained by many factors beyond the legal freedom to 
choose from among a number of schools; students may face high school fees, 
transportation costs, language or skill barriers, lack of information about schools, 
and social costs associated with attending school outside their communities.  
 
This paper describes the relationship between school choice and race in Cape 
Town, South Africa, and analyzes the impact of income and user fees on the racial 
integration of public secondary schools. Before the transition from apartheid to 
democracy in the early 1990’s, it was illegal for a student of one race to attend a 
public school designated for students of another race. Schools designated for 
students of each race were administered by separate departments of education. The 
1996 South African Schools Act abolished segregated education, and made racial 
discrimination in school admissions illegal. By 2001, colored students made up a 
significant proportion of the student body (just under 30 percent) at formerly white 
schools in the Western Cape province, but the racial composition of these schools 
was still very disproportionately white compared to the general population.
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1
 Several terms and omissions are important to note. 1) Although “black” is frequently used in 
South Africa as a term encompassing all “non-whites” – including people of black African, 
Asian, and mixed descent – it is used in this paper to refer to people of black African descent 
only. 2) Because people of Indian descent make up an extremely small part of the population of 
Cape Town, they are omitted from the discussion in this paper; in other parts of South Africa, 
however, they constitute a significant population group. 
2
 In 2001, 4.2% of the students at formerly white secondary schools in the Western Cape 
province were black, 29.1% were coloured, and 64.4% were white; the population of secondary 
school students as a whole was approximately 27% black, 56% coloured, and 16% white. From 
Fiske and Ladd (2004), using data from the Western Cape Education Department.  
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Although the apartheid education departments no longer have any legal existence, a 
high degree of racial segregation still occurs across the old apartheid categories. 
 
It is clear that the race of the student is no longer the sole factor determining school 
choice. Nonetheless, schools remain sufficiently segregated – both across apartheid 
categories, and even more so, across individual schools within categories
3
 – that 
some factor driving school choice must differ significantly along racial lines. A 
potential culprit is income, which is still highly correlated with race more than a 
decade after the end of apartheid.
4
 One mechanism through which income may 
affect school choice and segregation is school fees, which determine the direct cost 
of schooling to families, as well as the incentives faced by schools to admit 
students from households of different income levels. Schools determine their own 
fee level and the average fee differs significantly between schools of different 
apartheid categories, with formerly white schools charging by far the highest rates. 
Schools are also able to set their own admissions policies, but are required by law 
to grant means tested exemptions from school fees.  
 
This paper uses multinomial logistic regression to predict the likelihood that high 
school students of a given race attend schools of different apartheid racial 
designations, based on students’ household income and eligibility for fee 
exemption. The intent is to illuminate a part of the process of mutual choosing 
between families and schools that drives enrollment patterns, and to enable a better 
understanding of the relationship between income inequality, fee policies, and 
school desegregation. Although fees have featured centrally in the policy discourse 
shaping the post-apartheid education system, the results of this analysis show that 
income and fees may not be key factors in the choice between racially defined 
school categories. This finding calls into question the relevance of the current fee 
exemption policy, and demonstrates the need for a more nuanced understanding of 
the dynamics of race and inequality in South African schools. 
 
Section II of this paper describes the historical and political context in which school 
choice occurs in post-apartheid South Africa, and reviews the relevant academic 
literature. The data and model are described in Sections III and IV, respectively. 
Section V presents the results of the estimation, and Section VI analyzes the results 
                                                 
3
 This paper only looks at racial enrollment patterns across whole apartheid categories of schools, 
but integration within each category is not uniform.  
4
 Seekings and Nattrass (2005), Chapter 9. Interracial income inequality has decreased since the 
end of apartheid, but remains high.  
 4 
with respect to fees, income, and school desegregation. Section VII lays out 





Transformations in South African public education 
 
Until the early 1990’s, South Africa’s public education system was governed by 
strict racial segregation and centralized policy-making. Apartheid was a system of 
institutional racial segregation which placed white people of English and 
Afrikaaner descent at the top of the racial hierarchy and subordinated people of 
Asian and African descent. Educational separation was one of the system’s major 
pillars. The public education system was divided into 15 different departments 
based on race and geography. This paper considers three of these departments 
which operated in the Western Cape province: Department of Education and 
Training (DET) schools were for black students, House of Representatives (HOR) 
schools were for coloured students, and House of Assembly (HOA) schools were 
for white students. From this point on, this paper will use the terms DET, HOR, and 
HOA to refer to these three categories. Schools which were founded after the end 
of apartheid are labeled New Education Department (NED).   
 
Under the apartheid regime, no student was allowed to attend a school outside of 
his or her racial group. Public schools provided all whites – including poor whites – 
with a high quality education. In contrast black and coloured students were placed 
in schools which received low funding, poor teachers, few facilities, and a 
curriculum which required all students to learn Afrikaans and a skewed version of 
South African history.
5
 The prevailing attitude of the white bureaucracy toward the 
education of non-whites was that expressed by Minister of Native Affairs Hendrik 
Verwoerd when he said, “What is the use of teaching a Bantu [black] child 




Over the course of just a few years, South Africa made a large leap toward an open 
education system with a large degree of de jure choice for both families and 
schools. Beginning with a few leaks in racial restrictions in the last years of the 
apartheid government, the dam burst with the election of the African National 
                                                 
5
 Fiske and Ladd (2004), pp.40-47.  
6
 Fiske and Ladd (2004), p.42.  
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Congress (ANC) in 1994, and the subsequent passage of the South African Schools 
Act (SASA) in 1996, which unified the education departments and reorganized the 
public education system along non-racial lines. At the same time, control over fees, 
admissions policy, and language of instruction was devolved to individual schools, 
under the supervision of the provincial education departments.  
 
The result is that in many parts of the country students and schools engage in a 
process of mutual selection that is virtually unconstrained by the government. 
Under the SASA, schools are not allowed to “discriminate unfairly” in admissions, 
nor are they allowed to administer language or academic tests, nor refuse admission 
on the basis of inability to pay the school fee (although they can sue for 
nonpayment).
7
 In reality, these constraints are minimal. School can and do require 
students to interview for admission, show transcripts from past schools, write 
essays, and answer questions about their skills and about their parents’ jobs and 
family finances.
8
 In short, in spite of the restrictions defined by the SASA, schools 
are able to collect almost any information they wish about students and make their 
decisions accordingly.  
 
Similarly, students are able to apply for admission to any school, unconstrained by 
race (as in apartheid South Africa) or by residential location (as in the United States 
and many other countries).
9
 In spite of this expansion of choice, the vast majority 
of students still attend a school whose apartheid racial category matches their race. 
(See Tables 1-2) This separation is particularly pronounced between blacks and 
whites: although blacks make up more than 30% of the student population in the 
data sample, they represent less than 6% of the population of formerly white 
schools between 1998 and 2002.  
                                                 
7
 South African Schools Act, 1996.  
8





Pinelands High School notes in its admissions policy that, “It is in the best interests of the 
Learner that they are able to cope in an English medium environment. This ability will be 
assessed in the interview.” [italics added] 
9
 Although provincial education departments may, by law, create geographic feeder zones for 
schools, tantamount to residential preference in other countries, the Western Cape Education 
Department has not done so. (WCED Circular “Procedures for the Admission of Learners to 
Ordinary Public Schools.”) As of 2000, none of the provinces had created feeder zones. Fiske and 
Ladd (2004), p.85.  
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Table 1 
Racial Composition of Schools, by Apartheid 
Department 
   Race   





DET 93.25 1.19 5.56 100 
HOR 7.04 92.75 0.21 100 
HOA 6.51 22.19 71.3 100 
NED 62.22 24.44 13.33 100 
  Total 32.11 52.71 15.18 100 
[Source: CAPS
11
 and author’s calculations.  
Note: Schools that were designated for blacks under apartheid are called DET (Department of 
Education and Training), schools for coloured people are called HOR (House of 
Representatives), schools for whites are called HOA (House of Assembly), and schools founded 
since the end of apartheid are called NED (New Education Department).] 
 
Table 2 
Apartheid Department of School Attended, by 
Race 
   Race   
   Black Coloured White Total 
School 
Category 
DET 80.2 0.62 10.11 27.62 
HOR 11.26 90.44 0.72 51.4 
HOA 3.75 7.8 87 18.52 
NED 4.78 1.14 2.17 2.47 
  Total 100 100 100 100 
[Source: CAPS and author’s calculations] 
 
A number of issues featured centrally in the post-apartheid education policy shift. 
First and foremost was the legal deracialization of public education and the 
integration of the racially separated departments of education. Inherent in this 
process was the equalization of funding, which had been extremely unequal across 
apartheid education departments, with white schools receiving the highest level of 
per student funding, coloured schools less, and black schools the least. While the 
                                                 
10
 Data from the Western Cape Education Department reported by Fiske & Ladd (2004) on p.90 
shows that in 2001 DET schools were 99.5% black. It seems unlikely that DET schools in Cape 
Town were 5.56% white by 2002 – this may represent an error in the CAPS data.  
11
 Cape Area Panel Study, representative of secondary schools and students in the Cape Town 
metropolitan area in the Western Cape province. Described in Section III.  
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new government was committed to equalizing funding and improving the quality of 
the severely underfunded black and coloured schools, it recognized that a high level 
of redistribution would destroy the quality previously enjoyed by the small number 
of white schools, while barely making a dent in the funding of the large number of 
black and coloured schools. There were also fears that dramatic cuts in funding to 
white schools would push white families into private schools, removing elite 
political support for the public school system.
12
 The solution that was settled on in 
the SASA was to equalize public funding while encouraging individual schools to 
charge user fees to supplement their publicly provided budgets. This policy has 
created an enormous disparity between the budgets available to schools which 
charge high fees (HOA) and those which don’t (DET and HOR), and in the cost to 
students of attending different schools. As shown in Table 3, HOA schools charge 






School Characteristics, by Apartheid Department 
  School Category 
  DET HOR HOA 














     Non-Personnel R 209 R 165 R 82 
Fee per Student R 105 R 333 
R 
2,701 
Percentage of Students with Fee Exemption 1.2 3.6 5.7 
Fee as Percent of Public Funding (discounting fee 
exempt students) 3.0% 8.1% 57.6% 
[Source: Fiske & Ladd, 2004, author’s calculations]  
 
The average HOA school fee per student is more than 10% of the average black 
family’s total annual household income, and nearly 5% of the average coloured 
family’s income. Consequently, the concern arose that high school fees could act as 
a de facto racial barrier between poor black and coloured students and wealthy 
                                                 
12
 Crouch (1995), pp. 11-12.  
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 As a result, the Minister of Education created a policy in 1998 to 
partially or fully exempt certain families from the payment of school fees. The 
exemption rule laid out in the 1998 regulation (amended slightly in 2005) fully 
exempts any family in which the combined annual gross income of the parents is 
less than ten times the per learner fee charged by the school, and partially exempts 
any family in which the parents’ income is between ten and thirty times the fee.
15
 A 
family must apply to the individual school’s governing board (SGB) for an 
exemption, and if it is eligible for a partial exemption, the extent of that exemption 
is determined by the SGB. The school is not reimbursed by the government for any 
exemptions granted, and has the right to sue for nonpayment of required fees.  
 
In short, the post-apartheid education system has been designed allow for a high 
degree of legal choice between schools and families, and to allow schools to 
differentiate themselves and cater to different educational needs and tastes. Many 
potentially important differences between schools still fall along the lines of 
apartheid racial departments, however, including funding, student-teacher ratio, test 
scores, facilities, language of instruction, and the level of school fees.  
 
 
School Choice Background 
 
Much of the recent international literature on school choice has focused on 
estimating improvements in individual student achievement
16
 or, more tentatively, 
improvements in school quality due to increased competition
17
. Most studies have 
looked at countries in which admission by lottery and homogenous public school 
costs are often assumed. School choice, in this context, means a family choosing a 
school. Public schools generally cannot select students or charge fees. Even so, 
questions of who will attend which schools and who will see gains in achievement 




In South Africa, the marketization of public education has not only freed families 
from constraints on their choice of schools, but has also freed schools from 
                                                 
14
 CAPS and author’s calculations. See Table 4, below.  
15
 Government Notice No. 1293 of 1998, “Exemption of Parents from the Payment of School Fee 
Regulations, 1998.” 
16
 Hastings et. al. (2006a), Hsieh and Urquiola (2005). Overview of others in Neal (2002) and 
Ladd (2002).  
17
 Hoxby (2002), Fiske & Ladd (2001), Hastings et. al. (2006b).  
18
 Hanushek et. al. (2002), Hastings et. al. (2006a).  
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centrally dictated admissions, academic, and financial policies. Individual schools 
are able to charge fees, pick a language of instruction, and decide which students to 
admit. This not only makes it impossible to take advantage of lottery school 
admissions or random assignment of vouchers to isolate the treatment effect of 
school choice policies, it muddies the entire framework of educational decision-
making by allowing schools to choose students in addition to students choosing 
schools. In this context, the “who” questions – who attends which school, who 
gains from increasing choice – become even larger and more difficult to answer. 
Given South Africa’s history, “who” also has inevitable racial implications.  
 
The mutual choosing between South African families and schools distinguishes it 
from the context in which most of the existing school choice literature has 
operated, but there are lessons to be drawn from arguments about the impact that 
voucher programs will have on educational inequality. Neal notes in his overview 
of the literature on vouchers that tuition and admissions policies are “important 
determinants of student sorting among types of schools under vouchers.”
 19
 He 
argues that regulations such as requiring schools to accept the exact amount of the 
voucher as tuition, requiring random selection between applicants for 
oversubscribed schools, and giving students from disadvantaged backgrounds more 
generous vouchers could create a system in which stratification by student income, 
race, and ability was minimized. Education in Cape Town resembles a voucher 
system to a certain degree – a base level of public funding follows each student to 
his or her school of choice – so it seems likely that tuition and admissions policies 
will have a similarly important impact on enrollment patterns. However, the 
regulations surrounding the South African “voucher system” are the opposite of 
those Neal describes as being conducive to minimal stratification – schools can 
charge tuition (ie. a school fee) above the level of public funding and can admit 
students according to (almost) any standards they wish, and the level of public 




The impact of school fees on enrollment patterns is a little explored area of South 
African education, but an important one. Because there are persistent differences 
between schools in different apartheid categories, stratification in enrollment by 
race or income may indicate that South African students of different backgrounds 
                                                 
19
 Neal (2002), p. 39. Neal cites Nechyba (1999) and Epple & Romano (1998, 2002).  
20
 A small piece of public funding for non-personnel expenses is provided on a progressive basis 
according to the poverty of the school as a whole. However, total public funding per student is 
higher at HOA schools, which are wealthier on average, than at HOR and DET schools. See 
Table 3.  
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are receiving highly unequal educations. Fees also drive some of those persistent 
differences through their effect on funding. Thus, fees may partially determine both 
where a student attends school and the quality of the educational experience she 
receives at that school. 
 
The effect of school fees on differences between schools is well documented. 
Assessing the direct impact of school fees on funding is relatively straightforward, 
and has been analyzed in detail by Fiske and Ladd in their 2004 book Elusive 
Equity. They show that differences in the level of fees and the degree of success in 
collecting fees from all parents have led to large disparities in per student funding 
between schools of different apartheid departments. A summary of public and 
private funding differences between school categories is shown in Table 3. Even 
assuming 100% parental compliance with fee payment and discounting for the 
greater number of fee exemptions at HOA schools, fees boost per student funding 
by and average of 57.6% at HOA schools and only by 8.1% at HOR schools and 
3% at DET schools. This disparity is exacerbated by higher collection rates at HOA 
schools.  
 
The indirect impact of funding differences due to fees is more complicated. Case 
and Deaton have argued that in South Africa school resources have a causal effect 
on school quality and student achievement,
21
 although this claim has been disputed 
in other contexts by Hanushek and others.
22
 Case and Deaton find that both 
educational attainment (measured in terms of years completed) and test scores are 
higher for students at schools with lower student-teacher ratios.
23
 It is possible, 
therefore, that by perpetuating funding differentials between schools, fees also 
perpetuate deeper differences in quality between schools through their effect on 
school resources and student-teacher ratios.  
 
Much less is understood about the impact of fees on school enrollment patterns. 
Fiske and Ladd hypothesize that differential fees will cause families to sort into 
schools on the basis of their ability and willingness to pay the fee.
24
 They argue that 
                                                 
21
 Case and Deaton (1999).  
22
 Hanushek (1986).  
23
 Case and Deaton (1999) assert that they circumvent potential bias due to unobserved parental 
preferences in the estimated relationship between school resources and student achievement by 
examining black schools at the end of apartheid, in which residential location and school funding 
were largely controlled by a white bureaucracy rather than parents. 
24
 I make no attempt to analyze all patterns in school enrollment that may result from differences 
in school fees, instead focusing on the impact of fees on enrollment in schools of different 
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both parental preferences and attempts by schools to minimize the admission of fee 
exempt students will result in sorting by income. Noting that only 5.7% of students 
at HOA secondary schools receive fee exemptions, and assuming that the other 
~94.3% can afford to pay the fee, they conclude that, 
…either as a result of the fee policy or other factors, the formerly white 
primary and secondary schools serve primarily families with a relatively 
high income, whether they be black or white. This pattern suggests that 
to some extent race is being replaced by economic class as the 




Fiske and Ladd’s hypothesis dovetails neatly with a general argument, put forward 
most notably by Seekings and Nattrass in their 2005 book Class, Race, and 
Inequality in South Africa, that class is replacing race as the fundamental basis of 
inequality in post-apartheid South Africa. Seekings and Nattrass support their 
argument with respect to education by examining the relationship between class 
and educational attainment (measured in terms of grade attainment at particular 
ages), finding that children from upper-class households complete one or two more 
grades on average by age fifteen than those from working class households.
26
 Other 





This paper examines Fiske and Ladd’s hypothesis that differential school fees will 
cause students to sort between apartheid departments by income rather than race, 
by estimating whether income and fee exempt status are important predictors of 
students of the same race attending schools of different apartheid categories. 
Gaining a clearer picture of the relationship between income, fees, and enrollment 
patterns will also enable a better general understanding of how race and class 
interact in the South African educational system. As Fiske and Ladd demonstrate, 
there are still substantial inequalities between schools of different apartheid 
departments, and it is important to understand how public policy affects which 
students end up in which schools. For a country struggling to overcome the burden 
of its apartheid past, racial integration in schools may, in and of itself, be of high 
                                                                                                                                                              
apartheid categories. There may be sorting between high and low fee schools in the same 
category which remain unexplored by this paper. 
25
 Fiske and Ladd (2004), p.143.  
26
 Seekings and Nattrass (2005). The finding holds within as well as between racial groups. 
“Class” is defined by Seekings and Nattrass primarily in terms of occupation, rather than income, 
although they find a strong correlation between their occupational classes and household income.  
27
 Lam et. al. (1999).  
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social, culture, political, or symbolic value. Furthermore, the analysis of this aspect 
of the education system provides insight into more general dynamics of race, class, 
mobility, and opportunity in post-apartheid South Africa.  
 
 
III. Data and Sample 
 
The data used in this analysis is from the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS), collected 
in the Cape Town metropolitan area in three waves between 2002 and 2005. The 
study follows approximately 5,300 young people who were ages 14-22 in the first 
year of the study, and asks them about their experiences and attitudes regarding 
health, school, family, and work. The CAPS data has been matched with school-
level information from the national South African Register of School Needs, which 
contains information on the department to which each school belonged under 
apartheid.  
 
Because the policies defining the current public education system didn’t fall into 
place until after the implementation of the SASA in 1997 and the fee exemption 
rule in 1998, I focus on the group that entered 8
th
 grade (the first year of secondary 
school) between 1998 and 2002. This group of students was presented with the 
option of applying to a wide range of schools, unrestricted by race, and supported 
by regulations allowing exemptions from school fees. I further restrict the sample 
by looking only at individuals who appear to have lived in the same household in 
2002 as they did in the year they entered 8
th
 grade. This restriction is necessitated 
by a lack of historical data – CAPS contains household information (income, 
language, neighborhood characteristics) for 2002, but not the choice year, so it is 
necessary to restrict the analysis to individuals for whom the household in both 
years was the same. After these restrictions, the sample was reduced to 1,933 
students, 628 black, 993 coloured, and 312 white.  
 
As is shown in Table 4, below, the black, coloured, and white students in the 
sample differ in many respects. Blacks have by far the lowest household income 
and live in the poorest, mostly black neighborhoods. Whites are the wealthiest and 
live in the smallest households in the wealthiest neighborhoods, while coloured 
students are in the middle of the spectrum in terms of income and household size. 
As a result of these income patterns, almost all black students are eligible for a full 
or partial exemption at the average HOA school and approximately a quarter at the 
average HOR school, while only about a quarter of coloured students are eligible 
for an HOA exemption. White students’ mothers and neighborhood’s are much 
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more highly educated than black and coloured students’, who come from similar 
family and neighborhood educational backgrounds (in terms of years of school).  
 
It is also worth noting that almost all coloured students were born in Cape Town, 
while a large number of black and white students were not. The circumstances of 
immigration are likely different for black and white students, however: the majority 
of black immigrants are from the impoverished Eastern Cape province, whereas 
white immigrants are from a range of other South African provinces or from 
outside the country.
28
   
 
South Africa has eleven official languages, three of which are spoken by large 
groups in Cape Town. White people speak either English or Afrikaans, the majority 
of coloured people speak Afrikaans with a minority speaking English, and the 





Black Coloured White 
Household annual income (not incl. student income) R 25,294 R 58,182 R 190,060 
Proportion eligible for full fee exemption at average HOA school 0.68 0.25 0.03 
Proportion eligible for partial fee exemption at average HOA 
school 0.29 0.55 0.19 
Proportion eligible for full fee exemption at average HOR school 0.05 0.01 0.01 
Proportion eligible for partial fee exemption at average HOR 
school 0.22 0.04 0.01 
Number of members of household 6.38 5.80 4.07 
Proportion male 0.45 0.47 0.51 
Proportion speaks English at home 0.00 0.32 0.58 
Proportion speaks Afrikaans at home 0.01 0.68 0.41 
Proportion speaks Xhosa at home 0.98 0.00 0.00 
Mother's years of education 8.53 8.66 12.61 
Proportion not born in Cape Town 0.39 0.05 0.33 
Mean annual household income of neighborhood R 25,755 R 63,905 R 185,163 
Mean years of school of neighborhood 9.00 9.17 12.29 
Proportion living in a majority black neighborhood
29
 0.97 0.02 0.00 
Proportion living in a majority coloured neighborhood 0.02 0.92 0.02 
Proportion living in a majority white neighborhood 0.01 0.04 0.89 
[Source: CAPS and author’s calculations.] 
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 CAPS and author’s calculations.  
29
 The proportion of students living in neighborhoods with a majority of each race do not all add 





I assume that household income and language as measured in 2002 are reasonable 
proxies for those characteristics in the year the student entered 8
th
 grade, this being 
the only data available for households in CAPS. I mitigate potential bias by 
interacting household income with the number of years since the student entered 8
th
 
grade, as discussed in Section V. The problem is also countered by restricting the 
sample to those who lived in the same household in 2002 as in the year they 
entered 8
th
 grade, but the method of identifying those individuals is imperfect, and 




There are a number of places in the CAPS data where it is probable that there is 
some degree of measurement error. For instance, CAPS shows that more than 5% 
of students at DET schools are white, whereas data from the Western Cape 
Education Department show that in 2001 99.5% of students in DET schools in the 
province as a whole were black. There are also a few households in which reported 
student income is higher than reported total household income, so that the adjusted 








The South African public education system allows schools to set their own fee and 
to admit students of their choice, subject to non-discrimination on the basis of race 
or ability to pay the fee. This creates a situation in which families face a choice 
between schools which vary in many characteristics, including price. However, as 
described above, if total family income is less than ten times the annual school fee 
per student, the school is required to give a full fee exemption, without 
reimbursement from the government. If total family income is between ten and 
thirty times the fee, the school must give a partial fee exemption. Thus, different 
families may face different prices for the same school, depending on their income. 
Schools, although they may not legally base admission on the ability to pay the fee, 
                                                 
30
 Students are identified as living in the same household if they report living with at least one of 
the same adults: mother, father, grandparents, or guardian.  
 15 
face a disincentive to admit students who will be fee exempt. I assume that all else 
equal, a lower price will make a school more desirable to a family, while fee 





School choice in South Africa can be broken into two components: a family’s 
choice of a school, and a school’s choice of students to admit. The likelihood that 
we observe a student attending a school is the product of the likelihood that the 
school is the family’s first choice and the likelihood that the school admits the 
student. If Si is Student i, 
 
(1) Pr(Si, School a) = Pr(Si picks School a)*Pr(School a picks Si) 
 
First, consider the family’s choice. The family is choosing between all local 
schools – in this case, all schools in the Cape Town metropolitan area. These 
schools vary in characteristics that may matter to the family, including price, 
location, language of instruction, race of students, teacher qualifications and 
student-teacher ratio, matric examination pass rate, and educational philosophy. I 
take the family to be a unitary decision-maker; in different families, decision-
making power, costs, and benefits may fall differently on the student, parents, and 
other family members, but I assume here that educational decisions are made as if a 
single agent’s utility is being maximized. Therefore, the family’s choice of a school 
maximizes its utility as a function of the school’s characteristics. Both current and 
future costs and benefits are considered.  
 
I simplify the choice set of all schools, with widely varying characteristics, into 
four categories based on their racial group during apartheid. Formerly African 
schools are labeled DET (Department of Education and Training), coloured schools 
HOR (House of Representatives), and white schools HOA (House of Assembly). A 
number of new schools have been created since the end of apartheid, and these are 
considered in their own category, NED (New Education Department), because they 
have a significantly different history than older schools.  
 
While these categories do not capture all interesting variation between schools, 
they stand for variation in racial history and, to a lesser extent, current racial 
composition. Apartheid category is also not an unreasonable proxy for average 
differences in fees, student-teacher ratios, teacher qualifications, race of students, 
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number of students taking and passing the matric examination, and language of 
instruction, that still exist between groups of schools.
31
 The choice facing families 
is therefore presented as a choice between racially grouped sets of schools; School 
a is now a school in Category A. For the purposes of this analysis, I focus on one 
factor which varies between categories: school fees (ie. the direct cost of the 
school). The family’s choice between categories of schools becomes a function of 
its income and fee exempt status, controlling for a set of other student and family 
characteristics that might impact educational preferences, and conditional on a set 
of average characteristics of a school in Category A.  
 
(2) Pr(Si picks CA) = F(Yi, FXi, γi; λA)   
 
where CA is a school in Category A, Yi is household income, FXi,is fee exempt 
status (defined as income below a certain level, based on the average fee for a 
school in Category A), γi is a vector of student characteristics, and the function is 
conditional on a set of average characteristics of a school in Category A (such as 
the fee level), represented by λA.  
 
Now consider the school’s choice. The school faces the choice of whether or not to 
admit each student who applies, given a limited student body size. Students vary in 
characteristics that may matter to schools, including income, intelligence, skills, 
language, race, and family background. I take the school to also be a unitary 
decision-maker, but it is important to note that many relevant school policies are set 
by its school governing board.
32
 I assume that the school cares both about the 
money it raises from school fees and the characteristics of its student body, and 
chooses students to maximize a combination of these factors. Family income may 
factor into the school’s decision beyond the simple fee exempt/not fee exempt 
cutoff, because schools may expect additional contributions or services from more 
wealthy families, or because the school may use income as an observable proxy for 
hard to observe class or cultural differences in making admissions decisions. Thus, 
the choice of a school in Category A is also a function of the family’s income, fee 
exempt status, and other characteristics.  
 
                                                 
31
 Fiske and Ladd (2004).  
32
 The school governing body is composed of parents, teachers, staff, and students, but is legally 
required to have a voting majority of parents. Its powers include the ability to decide the level of 
the school fee, the language of instruction, and to adjudicate applications for fee exemption. 
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(3) Pr(CA admits Si) = GA(Yi, FXi, δi)  
 
where Yi is household income, FXi,is fee exempt status, and δi is a vector of student 
and family characteristics (not necessarily the same as those that matter for the 
family’s choice).  
 
Because we can only observe the end result of the choice process, I am unable to 
distinguish between the demand effect (those aspects which determine a family’s 
school choice) and the supply effect (those aspects which determine a school’s 
willingness to admit a student) of factors which seem likely to have both a supply 
and demand component, including family income and language. The probability of 
observing student i, labeled Si, at a school in Category A, labeled CA, is therefore: 
 
(4) Pr(Si, CA) = F(Yi, FXi, γi; λA)*GA(Yi, FXi, δi)   
 
I use multinomial logit regression to estimate a function of the form: 
 
(5) CA = c0 + αAYi + βAYi* FXi + δAFXi + γi + εi   
 
where c0 is a constant, Yi is household income, FXi is a dummy standing for fee 
exempt status, γi is a set of other family and student characteristics, and εi  is an 
error term. FXi is a function of Yi and the average fee in CA. Yi* FXi is an 
interaction term between household income and the dummy for fee exempt status. 
The estimated coefficients can be used to compute the predicted probability of 
observing student i at a school in Category A. For instance, if income were the only 
relevant variable in the choice between four categories of schools, A, B, C, and D, 
the predicted probability of observing student i at a school in Category A (with 
Category B as the base comparison group) would be: 
 
(6)  Pr(Si, CA) = 
iDiCiA YYY eee 1/  
 
In estimating this equation, I attempt to identify the general relationship between 
income and fee exempt status, and the likelihood that a student of a given race will 
attend a school of a given category; the multinomial logit does not assume any 
ordering of school categories. Because some characteristics might make a school 
category more desirable to students of a particular race (eg. low student-teacher 
ratio) while others might make it less desirable (eg. being located far away), it is 
important to remain agnostic regarding the ordering of school categories in the 
general model. Nonetheless, there are two sets of choices where it is interesting to 
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hypothesize about a possible ordering of categories: black students choosing 
between DET, HOR, and HOA schools; and coloured students choosing between 
HOR and HOA schools. Both sets of choices have a “default” category which most 
students attend (DET for black students, HOR for coloured students), and one or 
two categories which are attended by fewer students but which have “quality” 
characteristics (eg. more resources, lower student-teacher ratio, higher matric 
examination pass rates) that one would expect to make them more desirable than 
the “default” option in the absence of financial barriers (HOR and HOA for black 
students, HOA for coloured students).  
 
In the context of the hypothesis above, we can make a number of predictions about 
the sign of estimated coefficients for the choice between a “default” category and a 
“quality” category. One would expect α to be positive, as higher income should 
make the family more likely to choose a more expensive “quality” school (on 
average, HOR schools are more expensive than DET, and HOA schools are more 
expensive than HOR) and the school more likely to admit the student. The 
coefficient on the main income measure subsumes the effect of income on school 
enrollment due to willingness or ability to pay the fee, other school and 
transportation costs, and any unobserved factors correlated with income, and 
cannot be interpreted as the causal role of income itself. If willingness or ability to 
pay a school fee is a relevant factor, one would expect the marginal effect of 
household income to differ for the fee exempt and the non-fee exempt: if a family 
qualifies for a full exemption, then an additional rand of income should not have an 
effect on the component of school demand related to the cost of the fee. It may still 
have an impact on total school demand, due to other factors, including other costs 
associated with school or unobserved characteristics correlated with income. We 
would therefore expect β to be negative, but smaller than α, and to isolate the 
portion of the marginal effect of income that is due to a change in a family’s 
willingness to pay the school fee. The sign of δ is ambiguous, because fee exempt 
status should have opposite effects on family and school. Fee exempt status lowers 
the cost of a school, making it more appealing to the family; but it reduces the 
school’s funding, making the student less appealing to the school. Joint or 
independent significance of β and δ would provide evidence that fee exemptions – 
and consequently school fees – affect school choice.  
 
The school fee is computed as the average fee for schools in a given category. In 
the first estimation, fee exemption is defined as having a family income less than 
ten times the school fee, and I assume that above the fee exemption level the family 
pays nothing and above it they pay the full fee. In a later estimation, I add a 
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category for partial fee exemption, to create a more realistic picture for the group 
whose incomes are between ten and thirty times the average fee.  
 
Family and student characteristics that are controlled for in the analysis include the 
language spoken at home, household size, gender, majority racial group of the 
neighborhood, average household income and education of the neighborhood, 
immigrant status, and mother’s education. These are variables which could be 
expected to affect school enrollment, either by influencing the preferences, 
resources, information, or ability of the student or family, or by representing 
characteristics considered by schools in their admissions decisions. Language 
spoken at home may influence enrollment through the family’s preference for 
language of instruction at schools, or through the school’s preference for students 
who can communicate fluently in its language of instruction; a black student who 
speaks English at home may be more likely to attend an HOA school than a black 
student who speaks Xhosa at home. Household size accounts for the differences in 
disposable income that may be available to families of different sizes, and in 
particular, different total school costs between families with more and fewer school 
age children. Neighborhood characteristics, such as race, income, and education 
may stand for or influence unobserved family characteristics, such as taste for 
education or proximity to schools of different categories. Immigrant status is likely 
to have different implications for black coloured and white students, but in general 
may both stand for unobserved characteristics and directly influence the 
information or preferences of the family. For instance, many black students arrive 
in Cape Town from the impoverished Eastern Cape, and may live with distant 
relatives (who might be less willing to pay for school than parents), arrive in the 
middle of the school year (when in demand schools will already be 
oversubscribed), or lack information about the relative quality of schools. Mother’s 
education has frequently been found to have a strong relationship to children’s 
education and well-being, and stands for a range of unboserved family and student 
characteristics, including pre-school human capital, taste for education, and 
intelligence.  
 
The regression is estimated separately for each racial group, for a number of 
reasons. First, it allows each variable to have a different effect for students of 
different races. Second, by considering each racial group separately, I control for 
the impact of latent or explicit racism on school choice. Although racism may play 
an important role in schools’ admission decisions, or in the other opportunities 
available to students and their families, these factors will apply equally to all 
students of the same race. Insofar as cultural attitudes or educational preferences 
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may also fall along racial lines, this concern is also dealt with. Thus, I am able to 
compare the experience of black students with other black students and coloured 
students with other coloured students, without bias driven by racial differences in 
opportunity, information, or preference.  
 
I estimate the model in two different ways. The first is multinomial logit regression, 
which presents the relationship between each independent variable and the 
likelihood that a student of a particular race attends a school in a particular 
category. One school category (the one which the most students of that race attend) 
is taken as the base category, against which the likelihood of attending a school in a 
different category is measured. The multinomial logit considers all four school 
categories (DET, HOR, HOA, and NED), although only the results for categories 
containing a significant number of students are shown in the body of the paper.  
 
The second estimation method is logit regression. I use logit in addition to the 
multinomial logit for two reasons: first, to focus in on the choices which are most 
prevalent for each racial group (for instance, HOR and HOA schools are the only 
categories with large numbers of coloured students); and second, to obtain results 
for a binary choice which can be illustrated using a predicted probability graph. 
The independent variables are the same in the multinomial logit and logit 
regressions, but the dependent variable in the latter includes on the two categories 
that are most common for students of a given race (for black students, this means 





The model is limited by a number of omitted variables, including residential and 
school location, pre- and primary school human capital, and student intelligence. 
The model is also not able to give any account of heterogenous educational 
preferences within racial groups. Although these omissions may limit the overall 
explanatory value of the model, they should not bias the most important measures, 
fee exempt status and the interaction between fee exempt status and income, 
because there is no theoretical reason to expect that the correlation between omitted 
variables and income will vary at the level of the fee exemption. Furthermore, one 
would expect most of the obvious omitted variables – pre-school human capital, 
taste for education, information about school options – to be positively correlated 
with income. If bias exists, therefore, the results should be upwardly biased. The 
finding that the relationship between income and school choice is small and 
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insignificant for black students and small and significant for coloured students 
should, if anything, overstate the actual impact of income.  
 
Although residential and school locations are unobserved, the majority racial group 
of the neighborhood the student lives in provides an imperfect hint about whether 
the student is living in the same neighborhood as the school. If living in a majority 
white neighborhood was a strong positive predictor of attending a formerly white 
school, there might be reason to expect that students are simply more likely to 
attend their neighborhood school, regardless of race, and that geography is 
therefore a major omission from the analysis. If neighborhood race is not an 
important indicator, it provides a small piece of evidence that living near a school 
of a different racial category is not the most important determinant of attending it.  
 
Another limitation of the model is that there are several downsides to using a 
simplified categorization of schools by apartheid category. It provides little ability 
to analyze the differences between schools within the same category, which may 
vary widely in location, educational quality, fee level, admission criteria, and 
student body. Most importantly, apartheid category doesn’t necessarily equal 
current racial composition of school. Some schools may have become majority of 
another race and changed their policies, fees, and cultural attitude accordingly, 
although the majority have not.  
 
A different approach to this analysis might define school category by current racial 
composition, rather than apartheid department. This would have the advantage of 
more accurately representing some current school characteristics, and would allow 
the analysis to distinguish between black students attending formerly HOA schools 
which are now majority black and those which are still majority white. It has the 
disadvantage of discounting the enormous historical differences between schools in 
different apartheid departments, which is problematic given the relative newness of 
the post-apartheid system. It also introduces endogeneity between the choice of 
students of a particular racial group, and the racial composition of the school. 
Furthermore, by using apartheid categories, the analysis better represents the 





At first glance, it is plausible that income plays a large part in the decision to attend 
schools of different categories. The table below shows that average household 
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income does vary significantly between students of the same race who attend 
schools in different categories, particularly between black and coloured students 
who attend HOA schools and those who don’t. The role of school fees is less clear. 
While 25% of coloured students and nearly 70% of black students are eligible for a 
full fee exemption at the average HOA school (Table 4), and almost 30% of 
students at HOA schools are black or coloured (Table 1), only 5.7% of students at 
HOA schools were reported as receiving fee exemptions in 2002.
33
 This could be 
interpreted to mean that the black and coloured students who attend HOA schools 
are not those who are eligible for fee exemption (ie. wealthier students), or that 




Mean Household Income of Students by Race and 
School Category 
   School Category 





















(6) (863) (73) (11) 
[Source: CAPS and author’s calculations. Note: N in parentheses.] 
 
In spite of large average income differences between groups attending different 
category schools, however, the results of the regression analysis below show that 
income is only a significant predictor of enrollment for coloured students attending 
HOA schools – income cannot help us predict the choices of black students at all. 
Fee exempt status is not a significant predictor of enrollment for black or coloured 
students attending schools in any category. These results are robust to leaving out 
fee exemptions entirely, allowing for only full fee exemptions or both full and 
partial exemptions, and allowing the coefficient on income to vary with time to 
allow for measurement error.
34
 Other variables do have predictive power: mother’s 
                                                 
33
 Fiske and Ladd (2004), p.144.  
34
 The results of all regressions not shown in the body of the paper, including those with different 
income specifications and an interaction between income and the number of years since the 
beginning of secondary school, are shown in the appendix.  
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education, language spoken at home, and immigrant status are consistently 
statistically significant. This paper finds no evidence that the direct cost of school is 
a major factor in post-apartheid school choice, nor that fee exemption policies have 
contributed to the racial integration of school since apartheid.  
 
The results of the multinomial logistic regression analysis described in Section IV 
are shown in Tables 6 and 8.  I also use logistic regression, shown in Table 7 and 
Figures 1-4, to focus on and illustrate the two most prevalent choices: black 
students choosing between DET and HOR schools, and coloured students choosing 





Tables 6 and 7 show the results of two regressions analyzing the likelihood that a 
black student will attend a school in a particular category. The multinomial analysis 
sets fee exemption variables at the average HOA exemption level to represent the 
choice between HOA schools or DET and HOR schools. Then, I show a logit 
analysis with fee exemption variables set at HOR levels to more accurately 
represent the choice between DET and HOR schools, and to enable a visual 
illustration of the choice through the probability graphs shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
In both regressions, the dependent variable is the apartheid category of the school. 
DET schools, which are attended by 80% of black students, are taken as the base 
group against which other school categories are compared. Results for NED 
schools (new since the end of apartheid) are not shown because these schools serve 




Table 6 shows the results of the multinomial logit regression. Columns 1 and 2 
show the likelihood of attending an HOR or HOA school over a DET school, 
respectively, including only full HOA level fee exemption in the analysis. Columns 
3 and 4 repeat the same analysis, this time including a dummy for partially HOA 
fee exempt status and an interaction between that dummy and income, allowing 
income and fee exemption to have different effects for fully fee exempt and 
partially fee exempt students. A total of 532 students are included in the regression 
analysis.  
 
                                                 
35
 See Table 1. Full regression results, including NED schools, can be found in the appendix.  
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Table 7 shows the results of the logit regression. Column 1 shows the likelihood of 
attending an HOR over a DET school, including only full HOR level fee exemption 
in the analysis. Column 2 includes a dummy for partially fee exempt status and an 
interaction between that dummy and income. A total of 483 students are included 
in the regression analysis.  
 
 
HOA Level Full Fee Exemption 
 
In Columns 1 and 2, the coefficients on income and fee exempt status all have signs 
that are consistent with the hypothesis of ordered categories described in Section 
IV: the likelihood of attending an HOR or HOA school is increasing in income 
(and decreasing in the square of income) and positively affected by fee exempt 
status, and the marginal effect of income is lower for fee exempt than for non-fee 
exempt students. However, none of the coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 95% level. This is to be expected in Column 1 – being fee exempt at an HOA 
school should not make a student more likely to attend an HOR school.  The effect 
of income on the likelihood of attending an HOR school is quite small compared to 
the effect of income on attending an HOA school, which is larger, although both 
are insignificant. The coefficients on log income and the square of log income are 
also not jointly significant for either HOR schools or for HOA schools. The 
coefficient on the dummy for being eligible for fee exemption at the average HOA 
school is large and positive, and the interaction between fee exempt status and log 
income is negative. The fee exemption variables are neither independently nor 
jointly statistically significant at the 95% level using a Wald test – we cannot reject 
the possibility that both coefficients are equal to zero.  
 
Mother’s education, immigrant status, and language are highly significant 
predictors of attending HOR or HOA schools for black students. Having a more 
educated mother is a strongly significant positive indicator of the likelihood of 
attending both HOR and HOA schools, although the size the coefficient is nearly 
twice as large for the latter. Being born outside Cape Town is a significantly 
negative predictor of attending an HOR school, but surprisingly, it is not a 
significant predictor of attending an HOA school. The coefficient on speaking 
Afrikaans at home is positive and similarly sized for HOR and HOA attendance; 
the coefficient on speaking English is large and positive for HOR attendance. 
Although the coefficients on both language dummies are highly statistically 
significant, the estimates are based on an extremely small number of students (one 
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English speaker and five Afrikaans speaker at HOR schools and one Afrikaans 
speaker at an HOA school), and so should be interpreted carefully.  
 
The coefficients on variables describing neighborhood characteristics are somewhat 
surprising. Mean household income and education of the neighborhood have no 
predictive power. Paradoxically, living in a majority coloured neighborhood is a 
significant predictor of attending an HOA (formerly white) school, and living in a 
majority white neighborhood is a large, significant predictor (about the same size as 
speaking English) of attending an HOR (formerly coloured) school. If students 
were more likely to attend a school of a racial category that matched the majority 
race of their neighborhood, this could have been taken as evidence that students are 
simply likely to attend their neighborhood school. The results do not support this 
argument, however; instead, they could be consistent with the race of the 
neighborhood standing for some sort of unobserved class or cultural difference that 
affects school choice.  
 
 
HOA Level Partial and Full Fee Exemption 
 
Columns 3 and 4 show the results of the regression analysis when partial fee 
exemption is considered as well as full fee exemption. We can again disregard the 
fee exemption variables in Column 3 for HOR attendance. The coefficients in 
Column 4 on the dummy for partially fee exempt status and the interaction between 
the dummy and log income are both negative and neither is significant. The 
coefficients on log income and the dummy and interaction for full fee exemption 
change in sign and size, but are still not separately or jointly significant. Neither the 
size nor the significance (at or above the 95% level) of other coefficients changes 
when partial fee exemption is added to the analysis, with the exception of living in 
a coloured neighborhood which is bumped just below significance.  
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Table 6: Multinomial Logit – Black Students – HOA Level Fee Exemption 
 
    Regression 1:   Regression 2:    
    Full Fee Ex.   Full & Part. Fee Ex.  
    ______________________ ______________________ 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    
    HOR  HOA  HOR  HOA  
 
Log HH Income  0.686  26.544  -6.404  38.575   
    (0.10)  (1.08)   (0.78)  (0.93)   
 
Log HH Income Sq. -0.012  -1.111  -0.001  -1.861   
    (0.04)  (1.00)   (0.00)  (1.05)   
 
HOA FX  5.601  56.278  -74.206  27.511   
     (0.42)  (1.35)   (1.45)  (0.28)   
  
FX*HH Income  -0.516  -5.411  6.362  -3.258  
     (0.39)  (1.33)   (1.42)  (0.36)  
 
HOA Part. FX      -75.825  -29.686 
        (1.54)  (0.46)   
  
Part. FX*HH Income     6.497  2.334    
        (1.51)  (0.41)   
 
Log HH Size  -0.086  -1.720  -0.090  -1.717  
     (0.23)  (2.60)**   (0.23)  (2.57)* 
 
Male   0.339  0.845  0.402  1.061  
    (1.16)  (1.53)   (1.35)  (1.82)  
 
English   21.585  20.934  21.540  20.681  
    (9.78)**  (.)  (9.37)**  (.)    
 
Afrikaans  3.362  3.799  3.236  3.512  
     (3.57)** (2.55)*   (3.38)** (2.25)*    
 
Mother’s Ed.  .181  0.338  0.178  0.306  
     (2.82)** (2.76)**   (2.70)** (2.40)*  
 
Immigrant  1.064  -0.856  -1.094  -0.829   
     (2.70)** (1.10)   (2.76)** (1.07) 
 
Nbrhood HH Inc  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   
     (0.23)  (0.13)   (0.61)  (0.64)  
 
Nbrhood Ed.  0.181  0.229  0.010  -0.018  
     (0.40)  (0.34)  (0.02)  (0.03)  
 
Clrd Nbrdhood  1.755  2.794  1.540  2.289 
     (1.77)  (2.14)*   (1.55)  (1.75)   
 
White Nbrdhood  23.288  25.678  24.930  26.211  
    (6.37)**  (.)  (6.34)**  (.)   
 
Constant  -11.377  -163.038 70.748  -199.238 
     (0.31)  (1.20)  (1.11)  (0.81)   
 
Observations  532  532  532  532  
 
Base Group – DET 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         
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HOR Level Partial and Full Fee Exemption 
 
The largest groups of black students are at DET or HOR schools, so I conduct a 
logistic regression analysis, show in Table 7, to supplement and illustrate a section 
of the multinomial logistic regression above, with a binary between attendance at 
DET or HOR schools as the dependent variable. The set of independent variables is 
the same as the multinomial analysis, with the exception of the fee exemption 
dummies and interactions between fee exemption and log income, which are 
defined at the HOR level rather than the HOA level. Column 1 includes full fee 
exemption alone, while Column 2 adds partial fee exemption. In Column 1, the 
sign and size of the coefficients on log income and the square of log income are 
similar to those in the multinomial analysis – the former is positive, the latter is 
negative, and neither is statistically significant. The coefficient on the dummy for 
fee exempt status is positive, and the coefficient on the interaction between fee 
exempt status and log income is negative, and neither is statistically significant. 
The other variables in Column 1 are similar in size, sign, and significance to those 
in the first column of the multinomial analysis. When partial fee exemption is 
added to the analysis in Column 2, the signs of the coefficients on the log income 
variables and full fee exemption variables switch, but are still not significant; the 
coefficient on the partial fee exemption dummy is negative and insignificant, and 
the coefficient on the interaction between partial fee exemption and log income is 













































Logit – Likelihood of Black Students Attending an HOR 
School vs. DET School 
 
    Regression 1: Regression 2: 
    Full Fee Ex. Part. & Full Fee Ex. 
    __________ _______________ 
    
    (1)  (2) 
    HOR  HOR 
 
Log Annual Household Income 0.872  -10.493 
    (0.20)  (1.35) 
 
Log Annual Household Income Sq. -0.039  0.503 
    (0.18)  (1.34) 
 
HOR Fully Fee Exempt  6.690  -23.917 
    (0.41)  (1.01) 
 
HOR Fee Exempt * HH Income -0.768  2.684 
    (0.38)  (0.96) 
 
HOR Partially Fee Exempt   -38.905 
      (1.84) 
 
HOR Part. FX* HH Income   4.226 
      (1.82) 
 
Log Household Size  -0.227  -0.165 
    (0.60)  (0.43) 
 
Afrikaans   3.190  3.255 
    (3.32)**  (3.41)** 
 
Mother’s Education  0.180  0.168 
    (2.79)**  (2.59)** 
 
Immigrant   -1.093  -1.048 
    (2.76)**  (2.64)** 
 
Neighborhood Income  0.000  0.000 
    (0.58)  (0.45) 
 
Neighborhood Education  0.021  0.103 
    (0.05)  (0.23) 
 
Coloured Neighborhood  1.303  1.468 
    (1.27)  (1.42) 
 
Observations   483  483 
 
Note: Independent variables “English” and “White Neigbhorhood” dropped. 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
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Figures 1 and 2, below, show the predicted probability of attending an HOR school, 
based on the estimated coefficients from Table 7. They illustrate the relationship 
between income and the probability of a black student attending an HOR school, 
with all variables other than those defined by income (including fee exempt status) 
held at their means. The first graph assumes that families pay the full school fee 
above the level of exemption, and nothing below it; the second divides the students 
into three groups rather than two, adding the nuance of partial fee exemption. The 
effects of income and fee exemption are not statistically significant, and neither 
graph shows a high probability of attending an HOR school at any income level. 
The predicted likelihood of attending an HOR school hardly varies with income in 
Figure 1, and varies somewhat more at a very low level when partial fee 





 percentiles of the income distribution, however, showing that for the vast 
majority of black students, income is not a large predictor of the likelihood of 










In summary, the results do not provide evidence that income is a significant 
predictor of the category of school attended for black students, or that the direct 
cost of schooling is an important factor determining school choice. They do provide 
some evidence that language is a relevant factor – although the extremely small 
number of black students in the sample who speak a language other than Xhosa at 
home weaken this conclusion – and that mother’s education and immigrant status 
are significant predictors of attending an HOR or HOA school over a DET school. 






I conduct both multinomial logit and logit analyses for coloured students, but 
because the results are similar and the almost all coloured students attend an HOR 
or HOA school, I show only the results of the logit in the body of the paper, in 
Table 8.
36
 HOR schools are taken as the base comparison group. The independent 
variables are similar to those used in the analysis for black students, except that the 
omitted language dummy is Afrikaans and the omitted neighborhood race dummy 
is majority coloured. Full and partial fee exemption are defined at the HOA fee 
                                                 
36
 The full results for the multinomial logit are shown in the appendix.  
 31 
level. Column 1 shows the likelihood of attending an HOA school, including only 
full fee exemption in the analysis. Columns 2 repeats the same analysis, this time 
including a dummy for partially fee exempt status and an interaction between 
partially fee exempt status and log income. A total of 858 students are included in 
the regression analysis. 
 
 
HOA Level Full Fee Exemption 
 
In contrast to the result for black students, the coefficients on log income and the 
square of log income are jointly significant at just under the 99% level for coloured 
students. The coefficient on the dummy for fee exempt status is negative and the 
coefficient on the interaction between fee exempt status and log income is positive 
– the opposite of the signs that would be predicted by the ordered choice hypothesis 
above – but they are neither independently nor jointly significant. Mother’s 
education is a positive and highly significant predictor of attending an HOA school, 
as are speaking English at home, and, in contrast to the result for black students, 
having been born outside Cape Town. Neighborhood race and mean income are not 
significant, but mean level of education in the neighborhood is positive, significant, 
and larger that mother’s education. The coefficient on log household size is 
negative and significant.  
 
 
HOA Level Full and Partial Fee Exemption 
 
When partial fee exemption is added to the analysis, the coefficients on log income 
remain jointly significant. The coefficients on the dummies for both full and 
partially fee exempt status are positive but not significant, and the coefficients on 
the interactions between full and partially fee exempt status and log income are 
negative but not significant. Neither set of dummy and interaction are jointly 
significant. The sign, size, and significance of all other variables is similar to the 




   Regression 1: Regression 2: 
   Full Fee Ex. Part. & Full FX 
   ___________ ____________ 
   (1)  (2)   
   HOA  HOA   
 
Log HH Income  -4.931  0.182  
    (0.50)  (0.01)  
 
Log HH Income Sq. 0.258  0.069  
    (0.60)  (0.07)  
 
HOA Fee Ex.  0.963  18.478  
   (0.05)  (0.33)  
 
FX*HH Income  -0.042  -1.601  
   (0.02)  (0.31)  
 
HOA Part. Fee Ex   3.612  
     (0.13)  
 
Part. FX*HH Income   -0.236  
     (0.10)  
 
Log HH Size   -1.829  -1.874  
    (3.11)** (3.16)**  
 
Male   -0.361  -0.366  
    (1.17)  (1.18)  
 
English   1.173  1.178  
    (2.68)** (2.70)**  
 
Mother’s Ed  0.273  0.279  
    (3.44)** (3.51)**  
 
Immigrant   2.584  2.542  
    (3.99)** (3.88)**  
 
Neighborhood Inc -0.000  -0.000  
   (0.74)  (0.69)  
 
Neighborhood Ed 0.677  0.655  
    (1.97)*  (2.12)*  
 
Black Neighborhood -0.701  -0.534  
   (0.73)  (0.56)  
 
White Neighborhood 0.467  0.460  
   (0.89)  (0.88)  
 
Constant  13.710  -20.316  
   (0.25)  (0.14)  
 
Observations  858  858 
 
Base Group – HOR  
Note: Independent variable “Xhosa” dropped.  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Figures 3 and 4, like the graphs above, show the predicted probability of attending 
an HOA school, based on the estimated coefficients from Table 8. They illustrate 
the relationship between income and the probability that a coloured student attends 
an HOA school, holding all variables other than those defined by income at their 
means.
37
 The first graph assumes payment of the full school fee above the level of 
exemption, while the second adds partial fee exemption. Unlike for black students, 
the effect of income on the likelihood of attending an HOA school is statistically 
significant for coloured students. The graphs show that at the high end of the 
income distribution, marginal changes in income impact the probability of 





 percentiles of the income distribution. Changes in level or 
slope at the fee exemption points are hardly visible in either graph – neither partial 
nor full fee exemption appears to have a large impact on school choice for coloured 
students. Income has some predictive power for coloured students in the top 5% of 
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 As in the graphs above, these are constructed using the results of a logistic analysis, rather than 
multinomial. The results of the logit for coloured students are presented in Appendix, but not in 
the body of the paper, because the sign, approximate size, and significance of all coefficients is 





The results show that for coloured students, in contrast to black students, income 
may be a significant predictor of attending a formerly white school at the high end 
of the income distribution. However, being fully or partially fee exempt still does 
not have a significant impact on the likelihood of attending a white school, nor does 
it significantly change the marginal effect of income. Thus, the results provide no 
evidence that the direct cost of schooling is an important determinant of enrollment 
patterns, nor that fee exemption policies are the deciding factor for black or 
coloured students going to a non-“default” school. Some characteristics predicted a 
greater likelihood of attending an HOA school for both black and coloured 
students, such as mother’s education and speaking English at home. Others, such as 
immigrant status worked in opposite directions for the two groups, and some 
characteristics – such as household size and neighborhood education – seemed to 





There are three possible explanations for the lack of statistical evidence that income 
and school fees are important drivers of school choice in Cape Town: one, 
measurement error in the data; two, opposite supply and demand effects cancel one 
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another; or three, actual unimportance of income and fees in determining 





The first possibility returns to concerns outlined earlier about the lack of historical 
information in the CAPS data. All household characteristics included in the 
regression analysis were measured in the 2002 survey, while some of the 
individuals in the sample began secondary school as early as 1998. This may create 
enough noise to mask the income effect. As noted above, I have attempted to 
minimize error by restricting the sample to those who appear to be in the same 
household in 2002 as the year they started secondary school. Furthermore, adding 
an interaction between income and the number of years since the student entered 
secondary school did not change the sign, approximate size, or significance of any 
of the coefficients, and was not statistically significant itself, providing some 
evidence that the relationship between income and school choice didn’t change 
over time or due to historical measurement problems. 
 
It is also possible that using average fee levels for each school category – and 
consequently, average fee exemption levels – obscures the effect of income near 
the level of the fee exemption. However, this problem would be difficult to avoid 
even with more accurate information about household income and school fees. 
Because the fee and fee exemption are specific to the school being attended, fee 
exempt status would be endogenous to school choice if the actual level for each 
individual were used; because there are a range of fee levels within each category, 
families can, to an extent, choose whether or not they will be fee exempt. An 
alternative method of attempting to define a set of schools from which each family 
is choosing in order to determine the fee exemption level would be, if anything, 
more messy and potentially inaccurate. Therefore, I have chosen to define school 
fees and exemptions as the average of schools in a given category, assuming that all 





According to the model outlined above, one would expect income and fee exempt 
status to have opposite effects on the decisions of families and schools. The two 
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effects may be canceling, giving the appearance of a very small or insignificant 
total effect. In Equation 4, the coefficient on the main income measure, α, and the 
coefficient on fee exempt status, δ, should have both positive and negative 
components. On the family decision side, α should have a positive component, 
indicating that a marginal increase in income increases the likelihood that a student 
will choose a school of a given category. Fee exempt status should also increase 
that likelihood by eliminating the cost of the school fee, so δ should also have a 
positive component. From the school’s point of view, a student with lower income 
and fee exempt status is less desirable, all else equal, so we might expect the 
components of α and δ that are determined by the school to be negative.  
 
Since we can only observe the composite coefficients, it is not possible to 
disentangle the opposite demand and supply side effects. It is possible that these 
cancel, making the observed effects of income and fee exempt status small or not 
statistically significant. This explanation of the results is only plausible, however, if 
schools are either making illegal admissions decisions based on the student’s ability 
to pay the school fee, or making legal admissions decisions based on unobserved 
factors that are correlated with income.  
 
 
Fees and Income are Unimportant 
 
If the results above accurately reveal that neither income (except in the case of 
coloured students choosing HOA schools) nor fee exempt status are important in 
determining school choice in post-apartheid Cape Town, we must look more 






The most obvious other factor is language. In the Cape Town area, nearly all black 
students speak Xhosa at home. Most coloured students speak Afrikaans at home, 
while a large minority speak English. A majority of white students speak English, 
with a large minority speaking Afrikaans. Schools are able to set their own 
language of instruction, and students are constitutionally guaranteed the right to 
learn in a language of their choice, so schools adopt different language policies to 
cater to each of these groups. HOA schools generally teach in Afrikaans or English. 
Some HOR schools teach in Afrikaans and English, but most DET and HOR 
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schools officially teach in English although the vast majority of students and 
teachers are non-native speakers.
38
 However, schools provide varying levels of 
support and coursework for students who speak a different language at home than 
at school. Thus, far from encouraging integration or linguistic homogeneity, the 
South African education system’s language policy can hardly avoid encouraging 
school enrollment along racial lines.  
 
Families may want a school that teaches in the language they speak at home, or 
they may wish to ensure that their students are educated in another which language 
they see as more advantageous for economic or social reasons. Schools, on the 
other hand, are likely to want to admit students who are able to communicate and 
learn as fluently as possible in the language of instruction. While they are 
prohibited by the SASA from administering academic or language tests directly, 
they are permitted to conduct personal interviews or to request a written application 
or transcript from a previous school. Schools are not legally prohibited from 
discriminating in admission on the basis of a student’s ability to learn and 
communicate in a particular language. In sum, a student will be less desirable on 
average to a school if they are non-native speakers of the school’s language, while 
a school may be more or less desirable to the student because of the language 
mismatch.  
 
Although it is the stated policy of the Western Cape Education Department that all 
primary school children learn a second language,
39
 it is likely both that there is 
variation in the success with which primary schools actually teach a second 
language and that students who speak a language at home will be more fluent than 
those picking it up as a second or third language. The fact that a tiny percentage of 
the black population of Cape Town speaks a language other than Xhosa at home 
seems an obvious barrier to their attendance at Afrikaans and English majority 
HOA and HOR schools. The lack of variation also means, however, that it is 
difficult to use the results of this analysis to assess the true importance of language 
for black students – 8 of the 628 black students in the sample report speaking 
Afrikaans at home, and only 3 speak English. Furthermore, language alone cannot 
explain the far greater number of black students who attend HOR than HOA 
schools. Neither HOR nor HOA schools provide a language match for black 
students, although the former may be generally less selective, and therefore less 
likely to use language skill to determine admissions.  
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 Western Cape Education Department Online, “Find-A-School,” http://wced.wcape.gov.za.  
39
 Western Cape Education Department, “Language Policy in the Primary Schools of the Western 
Cape,” 2002.  
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For coloured students, speaking English has a significantly positive effect on the 
probability of attending an HOA school versus an HOR school. Since there are 
HOA schools targeted at both Afrikaans and English speakers, it is not immediately 
clear why this should be the case. One possibility is that English language HOA 
schools are more likely to attract or admit coloured students for historical and 
cultural reasons. Although both Afrikaans- and English-speaking whites were 
privileged by apartheid, Afrikaaners were perceived as more closely associated 
with the racist and authoritarian regime than the English. There may be cultural 
hangover from apartheid such that coloured students are more reluctant to attend 
Afrikaaner schools, or Afrikaaner schools are less likely to admit coloured 
students.
40
 Another possible explanation is that speaking English at home is 
symbolic of upward mobility or strong emphasis on education in coloured families. 
Some families make an active choice to bring their children up speaking English 
rather than Afrikaans, as a way to get ahead at school or in the workplace. In this 
case, speaking English may stand for unobserved family preferences or 
characteristics that make them more likely to send their children to an HOA school.  
  
 
Omitted Variables  
 
Unobserved pre-school and primary school acquisition of human capital may 
differentiate between students of the same race who attend different category 
schools. Differences in educational achievement begin well before secondary 
school, and students have vastly different educational backgrounds, language skills, 
and extracurricular experiences when they apply for admission to 8
th
 grade. This 
explanation, of course, begs the question of how students of the same race are 
sorted into primary schools of differing quality. The answer may include pre-school 
experiences at home, neighborhood, and again, unobserved family characteristics.   
 
Neighborhood and geographic coincidence may influence both primary and 
secondary school choice. Although living in a majority white neighborhood is, 
surprisingly, not a significant predictor of attending an HOA school, living or 
working near an HOA school – and in particular, an HOA school with a friendly 
admissions policy – may influence school choice. Or, some students may live in 
formerly white neighborhoods with HOA schools which have become majority 
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 An undersubscribed Afrikaans-medium primary school in Cape Town issued an open invitation 
to a nearby Afrikaans-speaking coloured community to apply to the school, offering fee 
exemptions and transportation to school. The school received not a single response. (Interview 




black or coloured since the end of apartheid. Transportation and distance from 
school can be significant barriers in South Africa, where neighborhoods were 
designed during apartheid with the specific intent of making it difficult to travel 
between white, coloured, and black areas. The townships in which most black 
students live are far outside the city center and the white suburbs, and are separated 
by train tracks, highways and rivers. Traveling out of the townships or coloured 
suburbs by train or taxi can be expensive, and dangerous for a student alone. 
Reduced transportation time and costs could be a significant inducement to attend a 
school of another category.  
 
I argue above that omitted variables should not unduly bias the results for the effect 
of fee exemption, and should, if anything, overstate the predictive power of 
income. However, unobserved factors such as pre-secondary human capital, 
geography, and transportation costs may be important unobserved determinants of 





School fees have figured centrally in the post-apartheid debate over the structure of 
public education, under the assumption that they play a major role in determining 
both school quality and enrollment patterns. However, this analysis finds no 
evidence that eligibility for a fee exemption increases the probability that a black 
student will attend a formerly coloured or white school, or that a coloured student 
will attend a formerly white school. I also find no statistically significant 
relationship between income and school choice for black students, and a small, 
significant relationship for coloured students at the top end of the income 
distribution. These results show that income and fees may not be key factors in the 
choice between racially defined school categories, calling into question the 
relevance of current fee exemption policy.   
 
There are a number of areas in which further research using new data would help to 
confirm or deny the utility of current fee and fee exemption policies. First, 
measurement error and bias due to a lack of historical data could be eliminated by 
using data that is contemporaneous with school choice decisions. Second, 
geographic information on families and schools would enable the analysis to 
consider proximity between school and family residence, potentially a major 
determinant of school choice which is missing from this analysis. Third, more 
detailed school characteristics – including racial composition, exact school fee, 
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language of instruction, admissions policy, matric examination pass rate, and 
student-teacher ratio – would allow the analysis to consider differences between 
schools within the same apartheid department. For instance, are there clumps of 
black or coloured students at particular HOA schools, and if so, are there noticeable 
differences in fees (or other characteristics) between these HOA schools and 
others? 
 
The conventional wisdom in the academic literature on school vouchers and in 
policy circles in South Africa is that differential fees cause students to sort between 
schools by income; in South Africa this would keep many expensive formerly 
white schools out of the reach of mostly poor black and coloured students, resulting 
in a large degree of de facto racial segregation. Fee exemptions are an attempt, in 
light of this expectation, to increase access to education and to mitigate sorting by 
income and race due to fees. However, the results of this analysis indicate that it is 
unclear without further research how school fees and exemptions actually affect 
school enrollment patterns. Without arguing for the abolition of either fees or fee 
exemptions, it appears that policy may at least have misidentified the factors 
driving educational quality and enrollment patterns for black and coloured students.  
 
Fiske and Ladd show that it is far from evident that fees have increased the quality 
of formerly black and coloured schools. Fees provide a significant supplement to 
the resources available to HOA schools in the Western Cape, but not to DET or 
HOR schools, as shown in Table 5. This pattern is likely to be exacerbated by a 
new policy, implemented in January 2007, designating the poorest schools in each 
province as no-fee schools, which will disproportionately get rid of fees at DET 
schools.
41
 Although one of the original arguments for allowing fees in the mid-
1990’s was that it would act as a progressive educational tax – charging those who 
can afford to pay more in order to free up public funds for poorer schools – this 
redistribution of funds never fully materialized.
42
 In sum, fees do not enable the 
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 The no-fee policy requires that schools be receiving a certain level of public funding in order to 
abolish fees, but does not specifically indicate how this level of funding is to be reached and 
whether greater redistribution to no-fee schools is expected. Department of Education. “Amended 
Norms and Standards for School Funding,” 2006.  
42
 The only aspect of public school funding which is specifically indexed to the wealth of the 
school is the allocation of non-personnel spending under the National Norms and Standards for 
School Funding which came into effect in 2000. This rule requires that 60% of funding go to the 
poorest 40% of schools, but non-personnel funding usually amounts to less than 10% of 
education spending nation-wide. See Table 3 for Norms and Standard funding per student in the 
Western Cape.  
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schools serving most black and coloured students to significantly increase the 
resources available to them. 
 
The results of this analysis provide evidence that income and fees may also not be 
as important a factor in determining enrollment patterns as has been previously 
supposed. As explained above, this may be because other factors outweigh cost, or 
because fees influence family and school choices in opposite ways. Either way, the 
implication for those who wish to increase educational opportunity for black and 
coloured students – or who wish to encourage the integration of formerly white 
schools – is that the current fee policy is not sufficient. If cost is not the marginal 
factor in the family’s choice between school categories, further research should 
look more carefully at language, geography, primary and pre-school inequality, and 
cultural differences to understand the dynamics of racial choice and integration. If 
low income or fee exempt status is negatively influencing the likelihood of 
admission, the provincial government may want to supervise or constrain school 
admissions policies in order to change the way race and class affect educational 





Appendix Table 1: Multinomial Logit – Black Students – HOA Level Fee Exemption 
 
Regression 1:   Regression 2:   Regression 3:   Regression 4: 
 Only Income   Full Fee Exemption  Full & Partial Fee Ex.  Years Since Grade 8 
 ___________________  ___________________  ___________________  _________________ 
  (1)  (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7)  (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
 HOR HOA NED  HOR HOA NED  HOR HOA NED  HOR HOA NED 
 
Log HH Income  -0.810 -1.555 7.816  0.686 26.544 14.161  -6.404 38.575 -25.472  -6.238 41.605 2.675 
    (0.34) (0.31)  (1.25)   (0.10)  (1.08) (0.80)  (0.78)  (0.93)  (.)   (0.73) (1.01) (.) 
 
Log HH Income Sq. 0.040 0.112 -0.370  -0.012 -1.111 -0.660  -0.001 -1.861 -0.554  -0.024 -1.934 -0.564 
   (0.33)  (0.45)  (1.16)   (0.04)  (1.00)  (0.81)  (0.00)  (1.05)  (0.69)  (0.08)  (1.10)  (0.70) 
 
HOA FX      5.601 56.278 10.288  -74.206 27.511 -401.492 -78.589  35.423 -85.236 
       (0.42)  (1.35) (0.39)  (1.45)  (0.28)  (15.73)** (1.51)  (0.37) (3.32)** 
 
FX*HH Income      -0.516 -5.411 -1.020  6.362 -3.258 36.638  6.731 -3.968 8.829 
       (0.39)  (1.33)  (0.39)  (1.42)  (0.36)  (2.44)*  (1.47)  (0.44)  (0.58) 
 
HOA Part. FX          -75.825 -29.686 -411.549 -81.308  -20.429  -95.559 
            (1.54)  (0.46)  (.)   (1.61)  (0.31)  (.) 
 
Part. FX*HH Income         6.497 2.334 37.625  6.970 1.521 9.845 
            (1.51)  (0.41) (2.18)*  (1.59)  (0.27)  (0.57) 
 
Yrs Since Grd 8              0.636 3.975 0.523 
                (0.53)  (1.30) (0.23) 
 
Yrs*HH Income              -0.047 -0.422 -0.062 
                (0.38)  (1.38) (0.26) 
 
Log HH Size  -0.132 -1.774 -1.066  -0.086 -1.720 -1.057  -0.090 -1.717 -1.058  -0.045 -1.832 -1.091 
    (0.35) (2.72)** (2.01)*   (0.23)  (2.60)** (1.97)*  (0.23)  (2.57)* (1.98)*  (0.12)  (2.71)** (2.02)* 
 
Male   0.340 0.774 0.266  0.339 0.845 0.273  0.402 1.061 0.267  0.464 1.010 0.256 
    (1.16)  (1.41) (0.63)  (1.16)  (1.53)  (0.65)  (1.35)  (1.82) (0.63)  (1.54)  (1.72) (0.60) 
 
English   22.349 22.244 19.035  21.585 20.934 17.939  21.540 20.681 17.654  21.607 20.686 18.429 
    (10.12)**(.)  (0.00)  (9.78)** (.)  (0.00)  (9.37)** (.)  (.)  (9.04)** (.) (.) 
 
Appendix Table 1: Multinomial Logit – Black Students – HOA Level Fee Exemption continued 
 
Regression 1:   Regression 2:   Regression 3:   Regression 4: 
 Only Income   Full Fee Exemption  Full & Partial Fee Ex.  Years Since Grade 8 
 ___________________  ___________________  ___________________  _________________ 
  (1)  (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7)  (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
 HOR HOA NED  HOR HOA NED  HOR HOA NED  HOR HOA NED 
 
Afrikaans 3.356 3.475 -37.605  3.362 3.799 -33.624  3.236 3.512 -41.716  3.073 3.604 -38.483 
   (3.57)**(2.47)* (0.00)  (3.57)** (2.55)* (0.00)  (3.38)** (2.25)* (.)   (3.16)** (2.22)* (0.00) 
 
Mother’s Ed.  0.185 0.336 -0.099  0.181 0.338 -0.100  0.178 0.306 -0.097  0.178 0.327 -0.097 
   (2.90)**(2.75)** (1.25)  (2.82)** (2.76)** (1.27)  (2.70)** (2.40)* (1.22)  (2.70)** (2.54)* (1.22) 
 
Immigrant -1.093 -0.989 -0.116  -1.064 -0.856 -0.117  -1.094 -0.829 -0.111  -1.113 -0.899 -0.110 
   (2.77)**(1.29)  (0.26)  (2.70)** (1.10)  (0.26)  (2.76)** (1.07)  (0.25)  (2.81)** (1.13)  (0.25) 
 
Nbrhood HH Inc 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.28)  (0.35)  (0.80)  (0.23)  (0.13)  (0.79)  (0.61)  (0.64)  (0.80)  (0.60)  (0.44)  (0.76) 
 
Nbrhood Ed. 0.136 0.032 -0.488  0.181 0.229 -0.494  0.010 -0.018 -0.515  -0.019 0.169 -0.471 
   (0.31) (0.05) (0.96)  (0.40) (0.34) (0.97)  (0.02) (0.03) (1.00)  (0.04) (0.24) (0.92) 
 
Clrd Nbrdhood 1.680 2.393 -37.449  1.755 2.794 -33.410  1.540 2.289 -43.945  1.599 2.634 -39.738 
   (1.70) (1.88) (0.00)  (1.77) (2.14)* (0.00)  (1.55) (1.75) (.)  (1.57) (1.97)* (0.00) 
 
White Nbrdhood 23.093 24.573 -21.152  23.288 25.678 -20.863  24.930 26.211 -25.177  25.961 27.984 -17.132 
   (7.14)**(.) (.)  (6.37)** (.) (.)  (6.34)** (.) (.)  (6.56)** (.) (.) 
 
Constant -0.786 -0.198 -37.300  -11.377 -163.03 -71.943  70.748 -199.23  349.208  71.883 -224.03 130.505 
   (0.07) (0.01) (1.19)  (0.31) (1.20) (0.75)  (1.11) (0.81) (3.76)**  (1.09) (0.92) (0.33) 
 
Observations 532 532 532  532 532 532  532 532 532  532 532 532 
 
Base Group – DET 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses             
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%            
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Appendix Table 2: Logit – Black Students – HOR Level Fee Exemption 
 
   Regression 1: Regression 2: Regression 3: Regression 4: 
   Income Only Full Fee Ex. Part. & Full FX Years Since Grd 8 
   __________ __________ ___________ ____________ 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
   HOR  HOR  HOR  HOR 
 
Log HH Income  -1.287  0.872  -10.493  -11.962 
   (0.54)  (0.20)  (1.35)  (1.51) 
 
Log HH Income Sq. 0.067  -0.039  0.503  0.574 
   (0.54)  (0.18)  (1.34)  (1.51) 
 
HOR Fee Exempt   6.690  -23.917  -27.347 
     (0.41)  (1.01)  (1.13) 
 
FX*HH Income    -0.768  2.684  3.054 
     (0.38)  (0.96)  (1.07) 
 
HOR Part. Fee Ex.     -38.905  -39.543 
       (1.84)  (1.87) 
 
Part FX*HH Income     4.226  4.284 
       (1.82)  (1.85) 
 
Years Since Grade 8       0.283 
         (0.23) 
 
Years*HH Income       -0.012 
         (0.10) 
 
Log HH Size   -0.215  -0.227  -0.165  -0.123 
   (0.57)  (0.60)  (0.43)  (0.32) 
 
Male   0.313  0.334  0.374  0.431 
   (1.05)  (1.11)  (1.24)  (1.41) 
 
Afrikaans  3.274  3.190  3.255  3.158 
   (3.47)**  (3.32)**  (3.41)**  (3.24)** 
 
Mother’s Education 0.177  0.180  0.168  0.167 
   (2.76)**  (2.79)**  (2.59)**  (2.57)* 
 
Immigrant  -1.087  -1.093  -1.048  -1.053 
   (2.75)**  (2.76)**  (2.64)**  (2.65)** 
 
Neighborhood Inc 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.58)  (0.58)  (0.45)  (0.46) 
 
Neighborhood Ed 0.038  0.021  0.103  0.091 
   (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.23)  (0.19) 
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Table 2: Logit – Black Students – HOR Level Fee Exemption continued 
 
   Regression 1: Regression 2: Regression 3: Regression 4: 
   Income Only Full Fee Ex. Part. & Full FX Years Since Grd 8 
   __________ __________ ___________ ____________ 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
   HOR  HOR  HOR  HOR 
 
Coloured Neighborhood 1.339  1.303  1.468  1.562 
   (1.31)  (1.27)  (1.42)  (1.49) 
 
Constant  2.268  -8.546  50.029  57.266 
   (0.19)  (0.38)  (1.25)  (1.40) 
 
Observations  483  483  483  483 
 
Base Group – DET  
Note: Independent Variables “English” and “White Neighborhood” dropped.  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses     





















Appendix Table 3: Multinomial Logit – Coloured Students – HOA Level Fee Exemption 
 
    Regression 1:   Regression 2:   Regression 3:   Regression 4: 
    Income Only   Full Fee Exemption  Part. & Full Fee Ex.  Years Since Grade 8  
    ______________________ ______________________ ______________________ _____________________ 
     (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
    DET HOA NED  DET HOA NED  DET HOA NED  DET HOA NED 
 
Log HH Income  5.008 -6.859 -3.401  24.289 -5.883 -36.327  84.670 0.770 -56.353  78.447 1.036 -59.100 
     (0.31) (2.12)* (0.39)  (0.62) (0.61) (2.34)*  (0.56) (0.03) (1.05)  (0.51) (0.04) (1.08) 
 
Log HH Inc Sq.  -0.197 0.340 0.187  -1.027 0.301 1.602  -3.573 0.048 2.394  -3.265 0.024 2.489 
    (0.27) (2.26)* (0.47)  (0.60) (0.71) (2.37)*  (0.56) (0.05) (1.08)  (0.50) (0.02) (1.10) 
 
HOA Fee Exempt     -1,097 -0.828 -109.674 -1,007.4 20.264 -177.698 -906.77 121.21 -186.89 
        (1.06) (0.04) (.)  (0.95) (0.36) (.)  (0.83) (0.38) (.) 
 
FX*HH Income      108.344 0.135 6.502  100.147 -1.758 11.935  90.132 -1.845 12.732 
         (1.07) (0.07)  (0.00)  (0.97)  (0.34)  (.)   (0.84) (0.35) (.) 
 
HOA Partial FeeX         62.696 4.972 -12.291  52.072 5.479 -16.097 
             (0.44) (0.18) (0.17)  (0.36) (0.20) (0.22) 
 
Partial FeeX*HH Inc         -5.541 -0.353 0.841  -4.603 -0.397 1.180 
             (0.44) (0.14) (0.13)  (0.36) (0.16) (0.18) 
 
Yrs Since Grd 8              5.295 -1.041 -1.906 
                 (0.83) (0.66) (0.45) 
 
Yrs*HH Income              -0.498 0.099 0.167 
                 (0.87) (0.70) (0.44) 
 
Log HH Size  -0.466 -1.849 1.685  -0.218 -1.831 2.011  -0.196 -1.906 2.059  -0.292 -1.926 2.050 
    (0.31) (3.20)** (1.58)  (0.14) (3.17)** (1.83)  (0.13) (3.28)** (1.83)  (0.18) (3.27)** (1.83) 
 
Male   -0.668 -0.339 0.394  -0.739 -0.342 0.489  -0.695 -0.331 0.445  -0.761 -0.292 0.465 
    (0.75) (1.12) (0.61)  (0.80) (1.12) (0.75)  (0.75) (1.07) (0.66)  (0.82) (0.94) (0.69) 
 
English   0.907 1.055 1.459  1.277 1.070 1.677  1.228 1.107 1.518  1.343 1.095 1.489 
    (0.90) (2.46)* (1.60)  (1.10) (2.49)* (1.73)  (1.04) (2.57)* (1.54)  (1.14) (2.53)* (1.50) 
 
Appendix Table 3: Multinomial Logit – Coloured Students – HOA Level Fee Exemption continued 
 
    Regression 1:   Regression 2:   Regression 3:   Regression 4: 
    Income Only   Full Fee Exemption  Part. & Full Fee Ex.  Years Since Grade 8  
    ______________________ ______________________ ______________________ _____________________ 
     (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
    DET HOA NED  DET HOA NED  DET HOA NED  DET HOA NED 
 
Xhosa   0.693 -28.237 2.893  86.177 -40.328 41.554  87.719 -40.981 43.140  78.492 -40.407 43.257 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (.)  (.)  (.)   (.) (.)  (.)  (.) (.) (.) 
 
Mother’s Ed  0.343 0.258 -0.003  0.361 0.258 -0.021  0.377 0.264 -0.022  0.364 0.268 -0.029 
    (1.59) (3.30)** (0.02)  (1.63) (3.30)** (0.13)  (1.64) (3.38)** (0.14)  (1.52) (3.41)** (0.18) 
 
Immigrant  -28.341 2.450 3.116  -41.767 2.430 3.475  -41.488 2.459 3.772  -41.695 2.476 3.876 
    (0.00) (3.92)** (3.16)**  (.) (3.88)** (3.37)**  (.) (3.85)** (3.37)**  (.)  (3.87)**(3.38)** 
 
Nbrhood Income  0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
    (0.24) (0.73)  (0.94)  (0.32) (0.75) (1.18)  (0.31) (0.70) (1.15)  (0.25) (0.68) (1.13) 
 
Nbrhood Ed  -0.367 0.693 1.238  -0.230 0.701 1.646  -0.235 0.681 1.655  -0.290 0.656 1.674 
    (0.65) (2.11)* (1.54)  (0.38) (2.09)* (1.94)  (0.39) (2.22)* (1.90)  (0.45) (2.25)* (1.84) 
 
Black Nbrhood  -29.466 -0.600 -30.024  -43.547 -0.600 -43.914  -43.746 -0.466 -44.454  -44.216 -0.507 -45.009 
    (0.00) (0.63) (0.00)  (.) (0.63) (.)  (.)  (0.49) (.)  (.) (0.54) (.) 
 
White Nbrhood  1.767 0.426 -35.470  1.676 0.427 -46.006  1.707 0.429 -46.122  1.649 0.471 -46.973 
    (1.17) (0.83) (0.00)  (1.11) (0.83) (.)  (1.12) (0.83) (.)  (1.04) (0.90) (.) 
 
Constant  -35.471 25.149 -3.756  -149.21 18.981 182.905  -507.11 -24.275 309.110  -474.35 -24.367 328.044 
    (0.40) (1.44) (0.08)  (0.67) (0.35) (2.12)*  (0.57) (0.17) (0.96)  (0.52) (0.17) (0.99) 
 
Observations  876 876 876  876 876 876  876 876 876  876 876 876 
 
 
Base Group -- HOR 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses             
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Appendix Table 4: Logit – Coloured Students – HOA Level Fee Exemption 
 
   Regression 1: Regression 2: Regression 3: Regression 4: 
   Income Only Full Fee Ex. Part. & Full FX Years Since Grd 8 
   __________ ___________ ____________ ______________ 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   HOA  HOA  HOA  HOA 
 
Log HH Income  -6.817  -4.931  0.182  0.095 
   (2.08)*  (0.50)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
 
Log HH Income Sq. 0.338  0.258  0.069  0.061 
   (2.22)*  (0.60)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
 
HOA Fee Ex.    0.963  18.478  18.530 
     (0.05)  (0.33)  (0.34) 
 
FX*HH Income    -0.042  -1.601  -1.605 
     (0.02)  (0.31)  (0.31) 
 
HOA Part. Fee Ex     3.612  3.560. 
       (0.13)  (0.13) 
 
Part. FX*HH Income     -0.236  -0.231 
       (0.10)  (0.10) 
 
Years Since Grade 8       -1.008 
         (0.64) 
 
Years*HH Income       0.095 
         (0.67) 
 
Log HH Size   -1.831  -1.829  -1.874  -1.901 
   (3.11)**  (3.11)**  (3.16)**  (3.17)** 
 
Male   -0.357  -0.361  -0.366  -0.336 
   (1.17)  (1.17)  (1.18)  (1.08) 
 
English   1.162  1.173  1.178  1.167 
   (2.66)**  (2.68)**  (2.70)**  (2.67)** 
 
Mother’s Ed  0.272  0.273  0.279  0.282 
   (3.42)**  (3.44)**  (3.51)**  (3.54)** 
 
Immigrant  2.600  2.584  2.542  2.561 
   (4.02)**  (3.99)**  (3.88)**  (3.90)** 
 
Neighborhood Inc -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
   (0.73)  (0.74)  (0.69)  (0.67) 
 
Neighborhood Ed 0.672  0.677  0.655  0.632 
   (2.00)*  (1.97)*  (2.12)*  (2.13)* 
 
 
Table 4: Logit – Coloured Students – HOA Level Fee Exemption continued 
 
   Regression 1: Regression 2: Regression 3: Regression 4: 
   Income Only Full Fee Ex. Part. & Full FX Years Since Grd 8 
   __________ ___________ ____________ ______________ 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   HOA  HOA  HOA  HOA 
 
Black Neighborhood -0.694  -0.701  -0.534  -0.566 
   (0.72)  (0.73)  (0.56)  (0.60) 
 
White Neighborhood 0.460  0.467  0.460  0.500 
   (0.88)  (0.89)  (0.88)  (0.95) 
 
Constant  24.938  13.710  -20.316  -18.278 
   (1.41)  (0.25)  (0.14)  (0.13) 
 
Observations  858  858  858  858 
 
Base Group – HOR  
Note: Independent variable “Xhosa” dropped.  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses     
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